Is the renewed conflict in Syria good for Israel? Understanding how the complex battle for Syria impacts Israel’s security

When Syria was welcomed back into the Arab League in 2023, many thought that perhaps the worst of the violence that characterized the Syrian Civil War was finally behind them.

At the time, many analysts said Syria’s readmission to the Arab fold was a blow to Israel's goals for the region and would lead to increased Iranian activity in the country while limiting Israel’s ability to target weapons transfers to Hezbollah forces within Syrian territory. 

The implication, as one analyst expressed, was that “the civil war is essentially over, Assad won and has been brought back into the Arab fold.” 

Beyond Syria’s acceptance back into the Arab League, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began to make moves for reconciliation between the two countries, after years of Turkish troops and proxy forces operating inside Syria for Turkish interests. At the same time, Syria continued its ties with Russia, as both countries seemed to be able to help each other in a moment of need. Assad allowed Russia to recruit soldiers for the war effort in Ukraine, and remaining Russian forces in Syria continued to prop up Assad’s control of the central and southeastern parts of the country. 

There were a few indications that Assad’s rehabilitation was not all that it seemed. For example, Israel continued to carry out airstrikes against Iranian interests with impunity in Syria, despite being involved in a ground war in Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023, and almost daily strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon – all without any clear reaction from the Assad regime. 

In April, Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that the Israeli government warned Assad not to interfere in its efforts to block Iranian arms transfers or risk regime change. 

When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad attended the recent joint Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in Riyadh last month, where Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman issued a rare public criticism of Israel, it appeared that Assad was again returning to a position of influence in the Arab world. 

However, the recent renewed offensive, primarily by Turkish-backed rebel groups has exposed just how fragile the rehabilitation of Assad really was. 

The question many analysts are now asking is how the renewed conflict in Syria will affect Israel, especially now that one of its major areas of conflict, the ground campaign in southern Lebanon, has reached at least a temporary ceasefire. 

Retired Maj.-Gen. Israel Ziv contends that the collapse of Assad’s control in Syria is bad news for Israel. He argues that the mechanism agreed to in the Lebanon ceasefire unnecessarily ties Israel’s hands in confronting Hezbollah by requiring U.S. approval before launching significant strikes against the terror group. This would allow Hezbollah to begin rebuilding itself in Lebanon and possibly partnering with other elements in Syria to the detriment of Israeli security interests. He further argues that this could open up the Golan Heights as an additional front for Iranian proxy terror groups. 

However, in contrast to Maj.-Gen. Ziv’s position, the IDF has continued to carry out strikes against clear Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire, both in Lebanon and in Syria. And while Assad has reportedly turned to Iran, pleading for help with the advancing rebels, Iran is still smarting from its failed proxy war strategy against Israel. 

Arguably, Hezbollah’s decision to enter the war against Israel one day after the dramatic Hamas invasion, and to do so on a limited basis – only launching occasional rocket barrages into northern Israel – proved to be a major strategic failure. One can only wonder what the effect would have been if the Radwan forces had poured across the northern border into the Galilee on Oct. 7, while the country was focused on the Gaza border carnage, however, it is clear that Sec.-Gen. Hassan Nasrallah’s gamble of limited support for Hamas did not pay off. 

Over the last six months, Israel increased the campaign against Hezbollah, while the Western world was still complaining about so-called humanitarian abuses in Gaza. 

In a matter of weeks, Israel began targeting senior Hezbollah leaders, and major Hezbollah infrastructure. This did not slow down after the “beeper attacks” – ultimately culminating in the decimation of most of Hezbollah’s senior military leadership, including Nasrallah himself. 

The beginning of the Israeli ground campaign in southern Lebanon proved equally destructive for Hezbollah and exposed Iran’s inability to assist its most significant proxy as it fought Israel directly. As a result, the threat of a battered Hezbollah significantly endangering Israel in the near future is less likely. 

In fact, the biggest loser so far in the renewed fighting in Syria appears to be Iran. With almost no air defense to protect its national territory – and the loss of the Aleppo Airport for resupplying Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups in Syria – it is uncertain how easily it will be able to resupply its proxies, as it has promised to do, or to project a threat towards Israel without risking a very costly response. 

On the other hand, some analysts, such as Daniel Rakov, posit that the advance of the rebels in Syria is good news for Israel, as it points to a weakened Russian position in the region, allowing Israel to have a freer hand to operate against any provocation from Iran.

Rakov, however, identifies an even bigger issue, and this is probably the major area of concern for Israel’s long-term security. The current conflict has increased tensions between the governments of Russia and Turkey. 

“The circumstances on the ground are very challenging for relations between Moscow and Ankara,” Rakov wrote in a long post on 𝕏. 

הנפילה של העיר הגדולה בסוריה, חלב, הלילה לידי מיליציית HTS מביכה מאד את מוסקבה, וצפויה להשפיע על הרלבנטיות שלה ביחס להסדרה בלבנון.
הרוסים הופתעו מההתקדמות המהירה של המורדים מאדליב, וניסו בימים האחרונים לעשות מהלכים שהם רגילים לעשותם - לתקוף מהאוויר, להמריץ את אסד, להפעיל לחץ… pic.twitter.com/qMt8IRHPDc

— Daniel Rakov (@rakovdan) November 30, 2024

While Rakov argues that the mess created by the renewed conflict turns attention away from Israel and could provide Israel with more freedom of operation to target Iranian assets and activities, he may be overlooking another threat. 

The rebel groups currently driving out Assad's forces are predominantly hardline Sunni Islamist groups, with ties to al-Qaeda and ISIS, and largely backed by Turkey. 

The Turkish president recently increased his inflammatory statements about Israel and has spoken of a return to the greatness of the Ottoman Empire. Earlier this year, Erdoğan even issued a veiled threat of possible military action against Israel over the Gaza conflict. 

The current rebel resurgence could lead to a strengthened Turkish position in the region, including possibly the loss of Syrian territory. Ultimately, both Russian and Turkish interests in Syria are less dependent on Assad himself. It is possible that Moscow and Ankara could agree to carve up Syria based on their own desires for the region. That would position two significantly stronger enemies at Israel’s doorstep.