PM Netanyahu deflects blame for Oct 7 to IDF; recalls how Israel resisted Biden administration's pressure to avoid entering Rafah

For a long time, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been criticized for his hostile attitude towards Israeli media outlets and his refusal to give Hebrew-language interviews.

This criticism has intensified throughout the Gaza War, as Netanyahu has rarely addressed the Israeli public to explain his decisions and policies in Hebrew, while giving sporadic interviews to English media outlets.

Therefore, his over one-hour-long interview on the Hebrew-language podcast “Shomer Saf” (Gatekeeper) with right-wing intellectual Gadi Taub, published last Wednesday, was a rare opportunity for the Israeli public to gain insights into the prime minister's decision-making process.

One of the most controversial issues surrounding the war is the question of how the Oct. 7, 2023, catastrophe could have happened, and following this, who is responsible.

In recent months, nearly all security chiefs directly tied to the military failures of Oct. 7 have resigned or were dismissed – including former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, IDF Staff Chief Herzi Halevi, IDF Intelligence Chief Aharon Haliva, and several high-ranking officers in the IDF Southern Command, including its head, Yaron Finkelman.

The only officials still in their positions today are Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar, who is in the process of being dismissed, and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

During the interview, Taub asked Netanyahu, “How did we get to a point where we didn’t see this (the October 7 massacre) coming?”

Alone among those directly tied to the Oct. 7 failures, Netanyahu has so far refrained from publicly pronouncing his personal responsibility – and he continued this stance during this interview.

In his responses, the prime minister avoided discussing the security assessments in the years leading up to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, assessments in which he was directly involved.

Netanyahu began by acknowledging that “there are many questions here” before quickly pivoting to a discussion of the failures surrounding the invasion by Hamas terrorists, which are mainly connected to Israel's security establishment.

“Ultimately, there was a simple question: Why didn’t we act? Why didn’t we act that evening when we had early warning signs? We could have acted, even with the forces available around the Gaza Strip, even with the air force. These are questions that will be investigated further,” Netanyahu said.

“But the more interesting question, in my view, is how we turned the tide. How is it that now, a year and a half after that disaster, we’re in a completely different place?”

The Israeli leader then launched into a discussion about the early days of the war, explaining how Israel managed to turn the tide after “it seemed we were really approaching the brink of destruction.”

Netanyahu recounted the decisions he made on the first day, as the Hamas invasion was ongoing.

The first tasks were the official declaration of war and the call-up of the IDF’s reserves.

He decided against a proposal to call up 60,000 soldiers, Netanyahu explained. “I thought we needed to bring in 300,000 reservists immediately, essentially mobilizing the entire army.”

Next, Netanyahu was faced with the dilemma of where the army should focus its efforts: on Hamas in the south or on Hezbollah in the north, which had, until that day, posed a significantly greater threat.

Some military leaders advocated a first strike against Hezbollah. “We couldn’t leave Hamas intact. We had to deal with this enemy first,” Netanyahu said, adding that he decided against going after Hezbollah simultaneously in order not to get “bogged down” on two fronts.

Faced with the question of how to attack Hamas, Netanyahu recounted that the Biden administration first counseled him to strike only from the air.

“I said to Biden, look, we’ve already tried that. It doesn’t work. We’ve tried it already. I led three strong operations against Hamas… But from the air, you don’t win this war, they told me, but our experts say it would be a terrible mistake for you to go in, because you won’t succeed.”

Ultimately, Israel decided to launch a ground operation, despite continuing U.S. concerns.

“The tactic was first to go in and start moving the population out while striking as much as possible… They [Biden administration] didn’t like that we went in – they thought it wasn’t a good idea to enter Gaza City itself,” the Prime Minister told Taub.

However, despite the IDF's advances, Netanyahu noted that he quickly recognized how initial global support for Israel began to shift against it.

“We saw that our fighters truly fought heroically and dealt massive blows… but as we did this, the political support that underpinned the military offensive began to erode, because, of course, if Hamas uses the Palestinian population as human shields… then we were certainly faced with a situation where there were civilian casualties.”

Here, Netanyahu emphasized a point he has highlighted throughout the war: “Precisely because we had both military strength and strong political support, we could bring Hamas to a point of great distress.”

In November 2023, Hamas agreed to a first ceasefire and hostage deal, releasing 81 Israelis and 24 foreign hostages.

“The rapid destruction of Hamas forces in the northern Gaza Strip, as we advanced south, combined with political support, led to us agreeing to a seven-day ceasefire. [Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar] was certain we wouldn’t resume fighting after the ceasefire,” Netanyahu explained.

"Despite this, the IDF returned to war, capturing Sinwar’s hometown, Khan Younis – but at this point, U.S. pressure ramped up again", he said.

“It was clear to me that we needed to capture Rafah as well, because that’s where the remnants of the organized battalions were… we couldn’t finish the critical part of the war, the destruction of the organized force – and here we ran into a problem. Because the U.S. essentially told us, if I can sum it up in one word: ‘Don’t.’”

In private, Biden even used “slightly harsher words,” Netanyahu recounted. “So he said to me, ‘If you go in, I’ll stop your weapons supply’,” including munitions, D-9 bulldozers, and more.

Netanyahu told Taub that the argument to back down “or, if you will, to submit to the American dictate,” was based on Israel’s dependency on the U.S., including equipment, as well as diplomatic cover at the United Nations.

“But I said in the decisive meeting… ‘The weapons will sort themselves out—we’ll fight with what we have. But if we give in, we’ll become vassals. And a vassal state won’t survive here,’” the prime minister said.

“A few days after that tough conversation with the U.S. President, Secretary of State Blinken arrived, and he reiterated, ‘Don’t,’ and, ‘There’ll be a weapons embargo if you do this.’ And I said to him, ‘Know this clearly, Tony, we’ll fight with our fingernails if we have to.’ And we went in.”

“That was a turning point in the war. And we went in. And then other things came up,” Netanyahu concluded, before turning the discussion to the war with Hezbollah.