Oct. 7 catastrophe in Sderot: IDF probe finds misguided preparations & lack of communication

Among the most indelible sights in Israel’s national memory of Oct. 7 is the battered ruin of the police station in Sderot, which was so damaged during the 24-hour battle against Hamas terrorists that it eventually had to be completely demolished.

On the morning of Oct. 7, thousands of Hamas terrorists broke through the Gaza border bulwark, overran Israeli defenses, and invaded deep into Israeli territory.

One of the prime targets was Sderot, a city of some 30,000 residents which is just around a kilometer (less than a mile) from the border.

On Wednesday, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) published its investigation of the battles in Sderot, where 53 Israelis were killed: 37 civilians, 11 policemen, three IDF soldiers, and two firefighters.

The IDF determined that in the defense of the city, the military had “misguided concepts, and failed.”

The military also found that there was “full responsibility on the Northern Brigade” of the Gaza Division, which was responsible for security in that area, but did not even maintain a defense file for the city, contrary to instructions.

Therefore, the brigade did not have set procedures for how to protect and defend the city in an emergency: “Sderot is within the operational area of the Northern Brigade. On October 7, no force from the brigade arrived.”

“The IDF had misguided concepts and failures over the years that placed the operational end in a situation it couldn’t prevent. The responsibility lies with the Northern Brigade, the Gaza Division, and the Operations Division. Misguided concepts for years,“ according to the probe.

However, the city itself had also barely been prepared for an invasion, with the few security measures in place even being weakened shortly before.

In August of 2022, it was decided to take all the rifles from the city’s emergency squad because there was no weapons depot that was up to regulations.

When the invasion came, the members had to fight with pistols against terrorists armed with RPGs and grenades. The emergency squad also hadn’t trained to repel an invasion during the two years preceding Oct. 7.

Among the small achievements during the fierce fighting is the fact that no resident of Sderot was kidnapped, and all 41 Hamas terrorists were either killed or captured.

However, the IDF was wholly unprepared to defend the city and slow to react in real time. The first troops arrived some one and a half hours after the invasion started.

Several other factors contributed to the failure, including the city’s emergency squad having no adequate weapons and the lack of any unified command structure.

The municipal control center collapsed early in the morning, obscuring the true scope of the invasion. Footage circulating on social media created panic, leading to calls for help that drew some 1,000 soldiers to the city, who did not have effective command and could have been used in other areas.

Many were then stuck in the city, as roads to the south were blocked. Conversely, an intact command structure should have blocked roads inside the city to limit the movement of the terrorists.

“Had a warning been issued to the city when the terrorists first infiltrated the area inside the security fence, it would have been possible to set up blocking forces at key points at the city entrances and thwart enemy attacks,” according to the probe.

The invasion of Sderot began around 7 in the morning, with Hamas terrorists infiltrating the city in two main squads with their infamous white pick-up trucks traveling along Begin Boulevard.

Soon after, the first footage of the heavily armed terrorists on their trucks began circulating on social media, alarming the country that something had seriously gone wrong in the south.

One squad of some nine terrorists infiltrated and murdered several pensioners at a bus stop, before continuing to their target, the “Mall 7” shopping mall.

The same terrorists then tried to capture the mall but ran into a squad of elite Yamam border police soldiers, who killed three terrorists, and the rest fled.

At the same time, other terrorists began infiltrating several of Sderot’s residential neighborhoods and murdered several people there.

Around noon, IDF and police forces cobbled together from several different units achieved operational control of most of the city, except for the local police headquarters.

The main terror squad of 26 terrorists had immediately aimed for the police station. When they arrived, they killed three police officers outside the building before breaking in.

During the attempt of the police officers to get to the roof, four terrorists were killed by one of the officers. Several other officers barricaded themselves on the roof and called for help.

Shortly afterwards, a first police force of six officers arrived at the station and began battling the terrorists. Over an hour later, a second unit arrived and entered the station, where one of them was killed.

Only two hours after the start of the battle did a commando unit arrive on the scene. After another hour, the force broke into the station and rescued several wounded police officers, including those on the roof.

Gun battles continued for hours, until the Yamam commando began a “pressure cooker” procedure, in which a building is completely surrounded, and the forces steadily escalate the fire, up to the use of heavy artillery and airstrikes.

A first escape attempt by the terrorists was foiled at this stage, and several of them were killed. Throughout the night, the remaining terrorists tried to break out, but tanks and bulldozers arrived and systematically destroyed the building.

In the end, all of the terrorists in the police station were eliminated within 24 hours.

Around 16 Israelis were killed in the battle around the police station, including 10 police officers and six civilians.

“The IDF failed in its mission,” the investigation concluded.

“The army was not prepared for a broad surprise raid. There was no depth defense – not for a company, not for a battalion, not for a brigade. All defense was based from behind the fence, quick solutions must be found for a broad raid.”

Another conclusion was that “the city of Sderot must receive a permanent force to protect it.”