Intelligence ignored, again - Reflections on Hamas Oct 7 attack by former US intelligence analyst

The recent Hamas terrorist attack in Israel is similar to the Viet Cong terrorist attacks, so much so that a little comparison is in order after 52 years. What happened in both places was not a failure of intelligence, it was a relatively new category – a failure to use intelligence. The intel was actionable, but the senior leadership failed to act on it for one or a variety of reasons.

It seems the CIA severely throttled back our tracking of Hamas as 9/11 redirected U.S. intelligence efforts towards al Qaeda and Islamic State. Though there was some tracking of Gaza activity before the Hamas terrorists’ attack of October 7th, Hamas had never been a direct threat to the U.S., so the CIA had generally left it to Israel to keep track of Hamas.

Though CIA chief William Burns warned of possible violence between the Palestinians and Israel in early 2023, Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, seemed to think otherwise in an October article for Foreign Affairs magazine. He patted himself on the back with, “in the face of serious frictions, we have de-escalated crises in Gaza and restored direct diplomacy between the parties after years of its absence.”

Some two weeks before the Hamas massacre, both the Israel Security Agency and the Israel Defense Forces concluded much the same thing, though not based on any solid intelligence. Hamas had been receiving funds from Qatar, which added to this Israeli view. “It’s clear that there was a tactical and conceptual surprise that led to a strategic failing - though it can be turned around, “said IDF MI Directorate head MG (ret) Amos Yadlin.

Once again, the CIA and military Intel organizations ignored what was happening in Vietnam because Tet 1972 had been over for a month and a half, and the warning came from HUMINT was never thought to be of much value. But the 571st MI Detachment was to put the tactical picture for everyone globally.

The 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, composed by the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, didn’t mention Gaza or Hamas at all.

The first possible action that could have been taken against Hamas was striking their financial network. The head of economic warfare in the Mossad said that he warned Netanyahu many times that Hamas could be financially crushed, but no action was ever taken.

There was a warning given to Israel a few days before Hamas struck. It was from the Eqyptian General Intelligence Directorate citing “something unusual, a terrible operation” from the Gaza area. This warning was forwarded to the Prime Minister’s office, where it seems that it was ignored. Agent reports were almost always ignored.

IDF intel. noted the night before October 7th that Hamas was switching dozens of SIM cards to Israeli SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards. Again, the Prime Minister was not made aware of this.

Just as North Vietnamese Army tanks which, in listening to U.S. comms, dropped the flags on their tanks when they heard they were targeted.

Women composed the tatzpitaniyot, Israeli women who served as lookouts in modern surveillance locations surrounding Gaza. Serving in 9-hour shifts in front of computer screens, each NCO or junior officer was responsible for a specific area (15x30km) inside the Gaza border fence. In the months before the Hamas attack, they reported Hamas’ military preparations, drone activity, efforts to take-out cameras, and Hamas’ use of vans and motorcycles and their rehearsals in killing tanks (for instance, an exact replica of a Merkava Mark 4).

In the days before the Easter Offensive of 1972 began, USMC Major (later to be General) Walt Boomer noticed and reported wooden crates being stacked in the distance from Fire Base Sarge along the sides of Route 9, indicating the resupplying of NVA forces. These would quickly be gone by morning. BG Giai was informed and responded that 3rd ARVN Division didn’t have the strength of numbers to aggressively check it out by air, if nothing else. This valuable Indications and Warning (I&W) indicator was apparently ignored.

We sent our agent reports daily, though no one listened. When we had “proof positive” who and when the offensive was to begin, we sent an initial “Ops Immediate” message to all the commands in S. Vietnam, Hawaii, or Washington, D.C., which prompted no replies for they all had gone on R&R and Easter holiday. No one faced any repercussions, and they all collected their Legion of Merits, as we were left to face new Soviet and Chinese equipment (for example, tanks, air defense and artillery).

“Nobody really pays any real attention to us” was said by the Tatzpitaniyot. “They abandoned our friends to die because nobody wanted to listen to us. It’s beneath their dignity to listen to a sergeant – who for two years has been staring at the same screen and knows every stone, every grain of sand – tell them something contrary to what the senior intelligence officers are telling them.”

Though we had no computers, I used our Huey helicopter and traveled in jeeps around our area of responsibility (I Corps), recording changes to maps and eyeing what routes and areas would be best used by the NVA if they were to move southward in-force.

“But we all thought we could flirt with Hamas (that) they would behave according to our expectations of them. And it all blew up in our faces,” said former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert. Play with fire and you’re going to get burnt, so says the expression.

We were still fighting in South Vietnam when Nixon and Kissinger visited China and the Soviet Union – we were not amused that we and our allies had to fight new communist equipment from both countries.

The similarities are close enough to make some generalizations about intelligence. In both cases, warning was given at various times before enemy action took place (it was ignored). In both cases, senior leadership failed to take action that would prevent or delay enemy action (it was ignored).

The analysts may have been of lower rank, but they were correct in their supposition about Hamas. Years ago, U.S. intelligence gathered the best personnel for its MI branch, partly due to a draft and partly because most of its personnel had at least some college. Because intel was a field that many chose and were chosen in which, as a group, all were justly proud. This is the time to remember and remake again. Intel with politics will eventually not work and the U.S. and our allies will only suffer because of it.