Only 5 secret accomplices: This is how Hamas leadership decided to attack on Oct. 7

Palestinian sources disclosed to the newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday new details regarding the Hamas attack on Oct. 7.

The decision and the timing of the attack were determined by only five people: the commander of Hamas in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, commander of the Hamas military wing brigades, Mohammed Deif, Mohammed Sinwar (Yahya Sinwar’s brother), Ruhi Mushtaha and Ayman Nofal, the central district commander and the person in charge of the joint operations room for the Palestinian factions, who was killed during the war.

According to the sources, the five commanders decided to launch the attack on Oct. 7 after receiving reports about complete silence along the border from units who were in the field. On the Friday before, the decision was made by the five commanders that the most appropriate time to launch an attack was Saturday morning, which is an official day off in Israel. They waited until midnight and gave the order to prepare.

"The most suitable time for the attack was Saturday morning, which is an official day off in Israel, the order to prepare was given at midnight"

The commanders in the field, along with the commanders of the Nukhba forces, received instructions and began to move forward through the morning hours and then launched the attack. The sources stated that senior Hamas officials abroad, including the head of the political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, knew that there was a plan for an extraordinary attack, but did not know the exact details about the date of the attack. They learned about the timing several hours before.

According to the sources, the invasion began with 70 terrorists, who carried out a surprise attack at several places along the Gaza Strip border from north to south, crossed through the border barrier after finding its weak spots and using gliders and parachutes to land in the vicinity of the IDF positions.

The sources noted that the 70 terrorists were selected from all over the Gaza Strip out of hundreds of Hamas “Nukhba” terrorists. They had trained intensively for years and underwent tests from time to time to check their competence and improve their combat skills. The sources noted that many of the brigade commanders in Gaza knew nothing about the intention to attack, to prevent information leaks to Israeli Intelligence. 

A year before Hamas' surprise attack, the commander of the Southern Command, Maj.-Gen. Eliezer Toledano, held a classified meeting in which he warned: "We will have to launch a pre-emptive strike," as was revealed this week on the KAN program Evening News. The meeting took place against the backdrop of an extensive Hamas attack plan called "The Wall of Jericho." The purpose of which was to infiltrate Israel at several locations simultaneously, alongside a significant military buildup of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

About 10 days ago, the New York Times published an investigative report regarding the Oct. 7 attack that dealt with the IDF's lack of preparedness for the Hamas invasion. According to the investigation, the IDF did not have an organized plan for the invasion, soldiers had to use WhatsApp and social networks to select targets in the field. In addition, helicopter pilots were asked to select targets based on media publications and Telegram channels.

Among other things, it described how soldiers of the Maglan Commando unit arrived at the areas of combat without being given any defined tasks. Some of the soldiers were helped by a Netivot resident who followed Hamas videos on social networks, and learned about calls for help from Israelis and passed the information on to the IDF. In another case, soldiers collected information themselves. A team commander told helicopter pilots to select targets based on information that appeared on the news and Telegram channels.